New York – Page 5 – Rochester Bankruptcy and Debt Relief

Chapter 7 Bankruptcy and Denial of Discharge for Willful or Malicious Injury

One of the limitations on receiving a discharge in a Chapter 7 bankruptcy is that the debtor cannot discharge any debt for willful or malicious injury.

Section 523(a)(6) of the Bankruptcy Code precludes the discharge of a debt “for willful and malicious injury.” As noted by the United States Supreme Court in Kawaahua v. Geiger, 523 U.S. 57, 61 (1998), the “word ‘willful’ in (a)(6) modifies the word ‘injury,’ indicating that nondischargeability takes a deliberate or intentional injury, not merely a deliberate or intentional act that leads to injury.” For the same reason, nondischargeability under this section will attach only to injuries that are malicious. In the Second Circuit, the Court of Appeals set the standard for “willful and malicious injury” in its decision in Navistar Financial Corp. v. Stelluti (In re Stelluti), 94 F.3d 84 (1996). The Court concluded that “[t]he term ‘willful’ in this context means ‘deliberate or intentional,’” and that “[t]he term ‘malicious’ means wrongful and without just cause or excuse, even in the absence of personal hatred, spite, or ill-will.” Id. at 87 (citations omitted).

In a recent case, In re Alessi, Judge Bucki held that the deliberate failure to abide by the terms of the contract, amounted to willful and malicious injury. In Alessi, the debtor, Mrs. Alessi, not only failed to pay a debt, but a failure to pay from funds that the debtor had agreed specifically to earmark for that purpose. The uncontroverted facts showed that the funds resulting from a real estate transaction were accessible and not otherwise encumbered, that the debtor knew of her obligation to turnover the funds, and that through his counsel, Mr. Alessi made timely demand for payment, even though not obligated to do so. The resulting injury was willful, in that Ms. Alessi deliberately and intentionally refused to turn over the sale proceeds. By violating a contractual provision for use of committed funds, Amy Alessi inflicted a wrongful financial loss without just cause or excuse. Hence, she caused an injury that was malicious within the meaning of section 523(a)(6).

Thus, if you are a debtor, you may have an obligation to follow through on the contracts where the funds are specifically designated for a given purpose. If you fail to do so, you may be denied a discharge.

If you are dealing with debt problems in Western New York, including Rochester, Canandaigua, Brighton, Pittsford, Penfield, Perinton, Fairport, Webster, Victor, Farmington, Greece, Gates, Hilton, Parma, Brockport, Spencerport, LeRoy, Chili, Churchville, Monroe County, Ontario County, Wayne County, Orleans County, Livingston County, and being harassed by bill collectors, and would like to know more about how bankruptcy may be able to help you, contact me today by phone or email to schedule a FREE initial consultation with a bankruptcy attorney.

Debtor and Bank’s Right of Setoff

One of the common issues that may arise in a bankruptcy, is that the debtor may have one or more accounts at a bank to which the debtor owes money. In those situations, the bank may assert its right of setoff.

The right of setoff in New York is available to a lending institution pursuant to Section 9-g of the Banking Law. Under that section, banking institutions have a long established right of setoff where a borrower is indebted to the institution and also has money on deposit with the institution. This right of setoff is preserved in bankruptcy by Section 553(a), which provides that,

“Except as otherwise provided in this section and in sections 362 and 363 of this title, this title does not affect any right of a creditor to offset a mutual debt owing by such creditor to the debtor that arose before the commencement of the case under this title against a claim of such creditor against the debtor that arose before the commencement of the case[.]”

At a first glance, the setoff appears to require a motion to lift the automatic stay since Section 362(a)(7) specifically covers “the setoff of any debt owing to the debtor that arose before the commencement of the case under this title against any claim against the debtor[.]”. Thus, under the statute, in order to exercise that right, the bank must make a motion to lift automatic stay. However, here in Rochester, in In re Catalano, Judge Ninfo has ruled that under some circumstances, the bankruptcy court will not require the motion to lift stay and set the following policy.

If a banking institution has a clear right of setoff under New York law and the debtor has funds on deposit with it in the amount of $750.00 or less, and also owes the institution a debt in excess of the funds on deposit, the institution may setoff the amount on deposit without obtaining formal relief from the automatic stay, provided that it gives the written notice described herein, and the trustee or debtor does not demand a hearing because there is a genuine dispute as to the asserted right of setoff.

As stated in the decision, the banking institution shall give written notice to the trustee, debtor and debtor’s attorney, if there is one, that: (1) asserts its right of setoff; (2) is accompanied by copies of the debtor’s schedules or other documentation that demonstrates the right of setoff; (3) sets forth a “contact person” at the institution, along with that individual’s address, direct telephone number and a fax number; and (4) advises that unless the trustee or debtor has a genuine dispute as to the validity of the asserted right of setoff, it will be effected ten (10) days after the date of the mailing of the notice. In the event that the trustee or debtor notifies the contact person of a genuine dispute as to the asserted right of setoff, the banking institution shall be required to bring a formal motion to terminate the automatic stay under Section 362(d).

This policy makes it extremely important that the debtor fully discloses his/her financial situation to the bankruptcy lawyer and also allow the bankruptcy attorney to engage in prefiling planning to protect the debtor’s assets from the potential right of setoff.

Your Homestead Exemption in Chapter 7 Bankruptcy

In New York, the debtors can protect the equity in their residences by utilizing their homestead exemption. Equity is typically defined as the difference between the market value of the property and the debt owed on it. The homestead exemption is one of the most ways to protect your biggest asset, your home, from the claims of your creditors. In New York, an individual debtor can protect up to $50,000 of equity in home by filing Chapter 7 bankruptcy, $100,000 if the debtor spouses are filing jointly. In order to take the benefit of the homestead exemption, the property has to be your residence when you file the bankruptcy.

I am often asked if the debtor can lose the benefit of the homestead exemption. My usual response is that the debtor could lose the benefit of the homestead exemption only in extreme circumstances. Typically, in order to lose the benefit of the exemption, the debtors must engage in fraudulent conduct or a clear showing of bad faith. Further, the wrongful conduct must be related to the homestead exemption.

If, for example, you own a $300,000 investment property in addition to your $100,000 residence, but you wrongfully claim in your bankruptcy petition that you live in the $300,000 property, you may lose the right to claim the exemption. As long as the debtor does not lie or attempt to hide the property from the bankruptcy court, the debtor will not lose the homestead exemption.

New Student Loan Program and Debt Relief

I have recently learned about a new program that will be good news to the hundreds of thousands of recent college graduates with significant student debt. A new program called Income-Based Repayment (“IBR”) may help you control your student loan debt.

IBR is a program introduced by the government in 2007; however, its full effects didn’t start until July 1, 2009 This program was designed to make sure that graduates who aren’t earning a significant income after graduation aren’t spending all their income on repaying their student loans.

IBR can help with individuals who meet the following criteria:

Have loans (to students, not their parents) from either the Direct or Guaranteed (FFEL) loan programs or (most) government-funded loans
Have enough debt to qualify. Specifically, you must have debt that would require you to spend more than 15 percent of your income in excess of 150% of the poverty level to pay off your loans in ten years – calculator available here

Interest Rates for Adjusted Loans

While the IBR program may make your monthly payments more affordable, it could also mean that your monthly payments don’t cover your full interest rates. This means that:

For federally subsidized loans, the government would pay the remaining interest for the first three years
For non-subsidized loans, the unpaid interest would be tacked onto the principal amount you owe

The second option may mean you end up paying more in the long term, but if your earnings increase over the years, this likely won’t be a significant problem. Plus, the IBR program has the unique provision that any amount still due after 25 years is forgiven.

What is Public Service Loan Forgiveness?

It’s the other loan forgiveness program taking full effect this month, and it’s designed to help those who work in certain so-called public service jobs, including those for the government and nonprofit 501(c)(3) organizations.

If your job qualifies under this program, your loans may be forgiven in full after 10 years of work (during which time you make normal loan payments). And, if your salary qualifies you for IBR loan payments while you’re working, you can still use that program to make payments more affordable.

To find out whether your employment situation may qualify you for help with student loans, visit IBR’s website. While student loans are not dischargeable in Chapter 7 bankruptcy, unless you are in a hardship situation, and have to be paid during the Chapter 13 bankruptcy, IBR may be that last piece of the puzzle on your road to a financial fresh start.

Student Loans Guaranteed By Parent and Bankruptcy

Recently I have been seeing a lot of debtors who have guaranteed their children’s student loans. When I am asked whether I can do something about those loans in Chapter 7 or Chapter 13 bankruptcy, my usual answer is no. The reason for this is that the government guaranteed student loans are not dischargeable in bankruptcy, except in extreme hardship situations, regardless of whether the borrower is the student or the parent who guaranteed the loan. Unfortunately, it is not uncommon for the student to default on the loan. In those situations, the full weight of the loan will have to be carried by the parent who guaranteed the loan. If the parent is already having difficulties paying his/her bills, this may be the final straw to push the debtor into bankruptcy.

When the debtor tells about this situation, I, as a bankruptcy lawyer cannot offer much help. Since the bankruptcy court here in Rochester has taken a position that in Chapter 13 bankruptcy the student loans will be paid, along with other unsecured creditors, pro rata, even a five year repayment plan might not reduce the loan significantly. In Chapter 7, the student loan would not be dischargeable.

As much as it pains me to say it, it is a bad idea for a parent to cosign a government guaranteed student loan. Further, parents guaranteeing the loans of their children face having student loans risk as they approach retirement. If the repayment of the loan is deferred by the student, this will keep the parents exposed to the debt until it is repaid, sometimes decades later. It entwines the two generations financially long after the student is an adult. If the parent is approaching retirement, it is not likely that the parent would have the money to pay off student loans.

Discharging Income Taxes in Bankruptcy

There are four general requirements for discharging an income tax in bankruptcy. Initially, the tax must be one for which the return was not last due within three years of the filing of the bankruptcy. Therefore, if a 2006 income tax return was last due on April 15, 2007, the three-year requirement would be met after April 15, 2010.

The “last due” requirement may be complicated by the debtor’s actions. If the debtor requests and receives an extension, the three-year clock starts after the last extension. See In re Wood, 866 F.2d 1367 (11th Cir. 1989). The three-year period is also tolled during the time when the taxing authority is barred from collecting the debt because of a prior bankruptcy.

The second requirement is known as the 240-day rule. For an income tax to be dischargeable, it must not have been assessed with 240 days of the filing of the bankruptcy. When a tax is assessed is sometimes complicated and depends on the practices of the federal or state taxing authority. For federal taxes, the I.R.S. regulations state that “the date of the assessment is the date the summary record is signed by an assessment officer.” This is not the same time as when the return is filed. However, when a return is timely filed, the assessment date is usually around the time a return is filed.

A debtor will know that a tax has been assessed when they are notified by the taxing authority of the tax claim. The exact date of assessment of a federal tax can be obtain by requesting and analyzing a debtor’s tax transcript.

Another related requirement is that, to be discharged in a bankruptcy, an income must not be not yet assessed but be assessable at the time that the bankruptcy is filed. Pursuant to 26 U.S.C. § 6501(a), tax liability must be assessed within “three years after the return was filed….” Therefore, even if a tax has not yet been assessed for some reason at the time a bankruptcy case is filed, and the case postdates the applicable return by three years, this requirement for dischargeability will met.

The third requirement relates to the timing of when the return is filed. If a return is filed late, it cannot not be filed within two years of a bankruptcy for the tax to be discharged. Under this rule, amended returns are treated as original filed returns. Also, if the debtor provides to the IRS with correspondence containing financial statements with all the information needed to complete a return, this can also be deemed to be a return. The two-year period begins once the taxing authority actually receives the return, and not when the return is mailed, as is the case with timely-filed returns.

The final requirement is the following. The return must be filed. A substitute return filed by a taxing authority on behalf of a taxpayer is not considered a return for these purposes. There is, however, a split of authority on whether a return filed by a debtor after a substitute return is filed can is considered a return for this test. The return must not be fraudulent and the debtor must not have attempted to evade the tax.

Tax evasion is generally rare and courts disagree on what is deemed to constitute tax evasion for purposes of this test. Tax evasion is found usually in situations where a debtor is hiding assets, constructing complicated transactions for tax purposes, or making false and misleading statements to avoid tax. However, evasion has also been found to exist in some cases in which a debtor has simply not paid a tax while having the ability to do so.

If you have pending tax liabilities, and you believe that you can satisfy all or some of the above requirements, you should meet with a bankruptcy lawyer to determine whether a Chapter 7 bankruptcy will result in a discharge of some or all of your tax liabilities.

Creditor Can’t Contact Debtor After the Bankruptcy Is Filed

When you file your bankruptcy case,the creditors must stop calling you. They can’t continue garnishing your wages. They must stop all collection activities because every bankruptcy case protects the debtor with the “automatic stay.” The automatic stay prohibits creditors from taking actions against you, unless they obtain a permission from the bankruptcy court.

While there are some exceptions, primarily for matters involving marital obligations, otherwise known as “domestic support obligations”, for most people and most debts, bankruptcy provides real relief.

If creditors keep calling you, mailing you, garnishing your wages or taking other actions against you, call your lawyer immediately. Regardless of whether the creditors acted with or without the knowledge of your filing, a bankruptcy lawyer make them stop. Also, regardless of whether the creditors acted with or without the knowledge of your filing, the creditors may be liable for actual and even punitive damages as well as attorneys fees.

Section 362 of the US Bankruptcy Code states that § 362. Automatic stay states that the filing of a petition in bankruptcy operates as a stay “applicable to all entities, of the commencement or continuation, of any action against the debtor.” Section 362(k) states that an individual injured by any willful violation of a stay shall recover actual damages, including costs and attorneys’ fees, and, in appropriate circumstances, may recover punitive damages.

So what’s a willful violation of a stay? The creditor needs to know that you have filed for bankruptcy. It must take an action to collect against the debtor after that stay is in effect. The creditor doesn’t need to willfully violate the stay, it needs to willfully take the action. That means the creditor needs to send out the collection letter after that creditor knows of the stay.

Here in Rochester, Judge Ninfo addressed the issue of willful violation of automatic stay in In re Engel, holding that mailing of a billing statement after the bankruptcy was filed was a willful violation of automatic stay. In Engel, the creditor was listed in bankruptcy schedules and was also contacted by the debtor’s attorney who demanded that the creditor stop any and all contact with the debtor. Even after the debtor’s attorney notified the creditor, the creditor mailed two additional billing statements. While the creditor claimed that the contact with the debtor was an unintentional mistake, the court found that the creditor’s actions were intentional and ordered a hearing on damages.

Chapter 7 Bankruptcy, Student Loans and Hardship Discharge

Almost everyone who has student loans knows that student loans are not dischargeable in bankruptcy. So why would a debtor meet with a bankruptcy lawyer regarding student loans? There are several good reasons to discuss your particular situation with a bankruptcy lawyer.

Sometimes a bankruptcy, either Chapter 7 or Chapter 13, can eliminate or reduce other debt, freeing up income to make the student loan payments more affordable. A Chapter 13 bankruptcy can pay some, if not all, of the student loan debt. If a Chapter 13 payment plan does not pay the student loans in full, it may be possible to propose a plan that will pay enough to reduce principal and make the debt more manageable. If you have a loan that will be forgiven, a Chapter 13 may help you deal with the payments until you have the opportunity to take advantage of debt forgiveness programs.

There are also provisions which allow a bankruptcy court to determine that the student loan debt creates an undue hardship. Section 523(a)(8) of the bankruptcy code says that student loans cannot be discharged in either chapter 7 or chapter 13, unless repaying the student loans would be an undue hardship on you or your dependents. Unlike some other exceptions to dischargeability, this section contains no deadline for either you or the student loan creditor to bring the matter before the bankruptcy court. Although the courts have interpreted that provisions very narrowly, and it is very difficult to litigate these issues for various reasons, you and your bankruptcy lawyer may be in a position to take advantage of those provisions.

Here in Rochester, Judge Ninfo addressed dischargeability of student loans and the so-called “hardship discharge” in In re Martin, holding that in order to obtain a discharge, the debtor must meet the three-part test established in Brunner v. New York State Higher Education, 831 F.2d 395 (2nd Cir. 1987). This test has been summarized in In re Kraft, 161 B.R. 82 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 1993) as:

[A] Debtor seeking to discharge an education loan must show:

1. That the Debtor cannot maintain, based on current income and expenses, a “minimal” standard of living for herself (and any dependents) if forced to repay the loans;

2. That additional, exceptional circumstances exist, strongly suggestive of continuing inability to repay over an extended period of time, or indicating a likelihood that her current inability will extend for a significant portion of the loan repayment period; and

3. That the Debtor has made good faith efforts to repay the loans.

In Martin, the debtor received a hardship discharge based on the following set of facts: “(1) the Debtor did receive an Associate’s Degree in Liberal Arts from Monroe Community College in May, 1988; (2) since her graduation, the Debtor has been unemployed and for a number of years has been receiving Social Security Disability, Medicaid, food stamps and Section 8 housing assistance; (3) the Debtor is a counseling client of the University of the State of New York/Office of Vocational and Educat ion Services for Individuals with Disabilities (“VESID”) where she has been counseled to set a vocational goal of “homemaker;” (4) the Debtor is in individual therapy at the Steuben County Community Health Center; (5) the Debtor suffers from several ongoing medical problems, including degenerative arthritis in her knees, morbid obesity, chronic asthma, hypoactive thyroidism and fibromyalgia; (6) VESID reports that its evaluation revealed the Debtor suffers from chronic depressive feelings and has suicidal thoughts; (7) the Debtor has no present employment prospects because of her physical and psychological conditions; and (8) there exists no indication of any likely change in the Debtor’s state of affairs.” Thus, a rather extreme set of circumstances must be present in order to receive a bankruptcy discharge. At the same time, each case should be judged on its own merits and carefully evaluated by a bankruptcy lawyer to determine how the debtor could benefit by filing bankruptcy.

Chapter 7 Bankruptcy and Reaffirmation Agreement

When you file a Chapter 7 bankruptcy case, as a part of your petition, you also file a statement of intention with respect to property that is secured by consensual liens. That means that you have to inform the bankruptcy court here in Rochester what you intend to do with such property, such as your home that has a mortgage, your car, if it has a loan associated with it that is secured by a lien, or any other property in which your creditor has a valid security interest. You are given a choice of whether to continue to pay on such obligations or to, if you do not wish to sign a reaffirmation agreement, to allow the creditor to take the property back. A reaffirmation agreement in bankruptcy is a new contract signed between you and a lender that reaffirms your debt and personal liability for the obligation. The law requires you to “perform” your intentions regarding financed personal property within 45 days of the Meeting of Creditors (341 Meeting) or the automatic stay terminates. Before signing a reaffirmation agreement, it is a good idea to discuss it with your bankruptcy lawyer as it is a binding legal document. You can revoke it within 60 days after signing. It is not difficult to revoke the reaffirmation agreement since all that is needed, is a letter saying “I don’t want this agreement”, with the letter being sent to the court and to the creditor.

The Bankruptcy Reform Act of 2005 (“BAPCPA”) states that any reaffirmation agreement(s) must be entered into prior to the filing of a discharge in bankruptcy. The reaffirmation agreement must also be approved by the court and not rescinded by the debtor prior to the discharge being filed. The court can also refuse to sign the reaffirmation agreement, if it is of the opinion that the debtor cannot afford the payments called for under its terms. Some lenders state they will repossess vehicles unless the debt is timely reaffirmed. Other lenders feel that it is better to receive monthly payments rather than lose money by selling repossessed vehicles at auction prices.

As a debtor, there is little risk in signing a reaffirmation agreement provided that you feel you really need the property (such as a car or a home) and you know you can afford the payment.

Failure to Disclose Assets in Bankruptcy, Confirmation of Chapter 13 Plan and Revocation of Confirmation Order

What happens if the debtors fail to disclose certain assets in their Chapter 13 bankruptcy and those assets come to light after the confirmation of their Chapter 13 plan? This situation was recently addressed by Judge Ninfo of the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Western District of New York in In re Cram.

On March 24, 2004, Richard and Pamela S. Cram filed a petition in Rochester, in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Western District of New York, initiating a Chapter 13 case. A Chapter 13 trustee was appointed. On their Schedule B of Personal Property, the debtors stated that they had no “[o]ther contingent and unliquidated claims of [any] nature….”. On April 30, 2004, the court orally confirmed their Chapter 13 Plan, and on October 5, 2004 an order confirming the plan was entered.

At the time the bankruptcy was filed, the debtors had a pending medical malpractice claim which resulted a subsequent lawsuit. On June 14, 2005, the debtors’ lawyer filed an amendment to their Schedule B of Personal Property, which amended the answer to question No. 20 regarding contingent and unliquidated claims, but did not amend their Schedule C to claim any proceeds that might be received from the malpractice claim as exempt.

Between June 14, 2005 and April 7, 2008 the debtors or their attorneys did not notify the court of the existence of the pre-petition medical malpractice claim set forth in the amendment, which was a Section 541 asset of the estate at the time the court confirmed their plan, even though in confirming their plan pursuant to Section 1325(a), the court believed that the requirement of Section 1325(a)(4), that the creditors would receive at least as much under the plan that they would in a Chapter 7 liquidation.

Section 1325(a)(4) provides that:

(a) Except as provided in subsection (b), the court shall confirm a plan if—
(4) the value, as of the effective date of the plan, of property to be distributed under the plan on account of each allowed unsecured claim is not less than the amount that would be paid on such claim if the estate of the debtor were liquidated under chapter 7 of this title on such date[.] 11 U.S.C. § 1325 (2009).

This section is known as “the best interests test”.

Once the trustee learned of the settlement, he moved to revoke the discharge, as well as for other relief. He asserted that on April 28, 2008, after the discharge order had been entered on April 7, 2008, the trustee learned that the claim had been settled on or about February 20, 2008 for $125,000 and that neither the debtors, their bankruptcy attorneys nor their personal injury attorney ever notified the trustee of the settlement or any prior settlement offers. The trustee argued, inter alia, that in view of the settlement, the debtors’ confirmed plan did not meet the best interests test.

Unlike in Chapter 7 cases, the court, in confirming a plan in a Chapter 13 case, makes an affirmative determination, as required by Section 1325(a), that, among other things, the plan meets the best interests test. Judge Ninfo held that because of the debtors’ failure to disclose the malpractice claim, which was a Section 541 pre-petition asset of the estate, either at the time of the oral confirmation of their plan or when the confirmation order was entered, the plan did not meet the best interests test, and neither the debtors, nor the trustee, ever corrected that failure by taking the necessary steps to insure that the plan was amended to include the proceeds of any recovery on the malpractice claim, either before or after the settlement. Thus, the confirmation order had to be vacated, and with no confirmed plan completed, the debtors would not be entitled to a Section 1328 discharge and the court vacated the confirmation order pursuant to Section 105(a).

Judge Ninfo further held that when the debtors filed the amendment to include the malpractice claim, they, as debtors, and their bankruptcy attorneys, as officers of the court, had an affirmative obligation to advise the court, not simply the trustee or their creditors, of the undisclosed asset, so that the court would be aware that its confirmation of the plan was improper and its confirmation order incorrectly entered, and could insure that the confirmation order was vacated or a proper modification to the plan filed to include any recovery.

The court further granted trustee’s motion to dismiss the bankruptcy, unless prior to July 6, 2009, the debtors: (a) pay to the trustee the amount necessary for the trustee to make a distribution to their unsecured creditors of 100% plus 9%; or (b) otherwise make arrangements with the trustee for the payment of the necessary amount within a reasonable period of time that is acceptable to the trustee and the trustee files with the court the details of such an acceptable arrangement.

The lesson of this case is that the debtors and their bankruptcy lawyers have an affirmative obligation to disclose any and all assets of the debtors, including any contingent or unliquidated claims. In this case, the consequences to the debtors could have been much more severe.